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It has happened since time immemorial that men conceive chil-
dren, but then die before the birth of their children. However, 
the possibility of conceiving children after death is relatively new. 
Posthumous conception is made possible by modern reproductive 
technology – in particular the cryopreservation of sperm and eggs. 
While the legislation of some comparative jurisdictions specifically 
deals with posthumous conception, this is not the case in South 
Africa (SA). The legislation in SA is not only ambiguous on whether 
posthumous conception is legal, but gives rise to uncertainty 
regarding the nature of the legal relationship between the surviving 
spouse or life partner and the fertility clinic where the gametes are 
stored. This medicolegal conundrum was solved in the recent case 
of NC v Aevitas Fertility Clinic (NC).[1]
Background[2]
NC centres on the reproductive intentions and tragedies of a couple 
who married in 2008 and planned to have children. However, in 2010 
the wife was diagnosed with Gitelman syndrome, making a pregnancy 
life-threatening for her. They decided to use a surrogate mother, but 
before these plans came to fruition the husband fell ill with cancer. 
Anticipating chemotherapy in 2013, he stored his sperm with Aevitas 
Fertility Clinic (Aevitas). They provided him with their standard 
sperm storage form, which offered four options for the stored sperm 
in the event of his death: (i) thawing and discarding it; (ii) assigning it 
to the ‘care’ of his wife or partner; (iii) using it for scientific research; 
or (iv) donating it to another couple. He selected that the stored sperm 
should be assigned to his wife’s care. He completed the form and 
provided a sample of his sperm to Aevitas. Although the husband’s 
prognosis was good, the couple discussed the possibility of his death 
and its impact on their reproductive plans. They decided that should 
he die, his wife would have a child using his stored sperm.
Despite the chemotherapy, the husband’s health deteriorated, and it 
became evident that he would not survive the cancer. In this context, 
the couple again discussed the possibility of the wife having a child 
after the husband’s death using his stored sperm and again agreed 
that she should proceed. The husband died in January 2017 and his 
widow set in motion their plans to have a child using his sperm, 
which Aevitas supported.
Legal issues
The main legal question was whether posthumous conception is 
at all legal in SA. If legal in principle, the next question is whether 
the law should require certain conditions to be met, and whether 
such conditions were in fact met in the specific case. A potentially 
complicating factor was the nature of the legal relationship between 
Aevitas and the widow concerning the deceased husband’s sperm. 
Was Aevitas legally obligated to provide her with access to the sperm? 
The widow’s legal representatives advised her to approach the court 
to obtain legal certainty.[2] She applied to the Western Cape High 
Court for a declaratory order – a legally binding form of preventive 
adjudication – that she had the legal right to use her deceased 
husband’s sperm.[3]
The parties to the lawsuit
The widow, as applicant, cited Aevitas as respondent. Apart from 
being in possession of the sperm, Aevitas was also its legal owner. 
However, at common law, the human body, or parts of it, are 
not susceptible to ownership.[4,5] Breaking with this principle, the 
Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons[6] (the 
Regulations) made in terms of the National Health Act[7] (the 
Act) provide that human gametes and embryos can be legally 
owned. Regulation 18(1)(a) provides that sperm not intended 
for the artificial fertilisation of the donor’s spouse is owned by 
the ‘authorised institution’. As the applicant was diagnosed with 
Gitelman syndrome, the couple intended to use a surrogate to have 
a child using the husband’s stored sperm. Therefore, Aevitas (the 
‘authorised institution’) legally owned the sperm.
Ownership is the most comprehensive right that a person has 
in relation to an object, which includes the right to use, alienate 
and even destroy the object. An owner’s rights in this respect can 
be limited through various legal means. However, a fertility clinic’s 
ownership of sperm is created and mandated through statute, raising 
the question of whether this ownership can be transferred, wholly or 
partially, through a private transaction such as a contract between the 
fertility clinic and a man who wants to store his sperm with them. If 
the answer is in the affirmative, was there a contract that transferred 
any constituent rights of Aevitas’s ownership of the sperm? Although 
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Aevitas supported the applicant’s plans of posthumous conception, 
this is not determinative of the parties’ legal rights. A fertility clinic 
owning sperm may feel ethically compelled to provide a person 
in the applicant’s position with access to the sperm, but without 
a legally binding obligation there is no guarantee that a change 
in circumstances may not lead to a change in its position. Should 
persons in the applicant’s position be content to have access to the 
stored sperm of their deceased husbands or life partners at the pleasure 
of a fertility clinic? The applicant decided to obtain certainty regarding 
her rights concerning her deceased husband’s sperm, meaning that 
her rights would be defined vis-à-vis Aevitas’s rights. Aevitas was cited 
as respondent – not as an antagonist in the lawsuit, but as a de facto 
possessor and statutory owner of the deceased husband’s sperm, within 
the context of legal uncertainty brought about by the Regulations.
Is posthumous conception legal?
The Act provides: ‘56. (1) A person may use tissue or gametes 
removed or blood or a blood product withdrawn from a living person 
only for such medical or dental purposes as may be prescribed.’ The 
Regulations mirror the Act: ‘These regulations only apply to the 
withdrawal of gametes from and for use in living persons.’
The ambiguity in these provisions is evident: should the sperm 
donor be living only at the stage of donating the sperm (so-called 
‘withdrawal’), or at the stage of using the sperm for in vitro fertilisation, 
or at the stage of embryo transfer? While posthumous retrieval of 
sperm is clearly banned, is posthumous use of sperm also banned? 
The applicant argued that the legislative provisions only require that a 
sperm donor must be living at the stage when gametes are withdrawn. 
Had the legislature intended to ban posthumous use, the formulation 
of the statutory provisions would have been different. For instance, the 
provisions might have been ‘withdrawn from a person who is still alive 
when the gametes are to be used’. The applicant therefore argued that 
posthumous conception is legal in SA law.
What are the conditions for 
posthumous conception?
The applicant argued that SA statutory law does not specifically deal 
with posthumous conception. Therefore, general legal principles 
must be applied. Referring to established precedent in medical 
law,[8] the applicant submitted that the principle of autonomy should 
guide the court. Autonomy is a principle of SA medical law and the 
SA Constitution.[9] Applied to posthumous conception, autonomy 
requires that deceased persons must have consented to their gametes 
being used posthumously. Where such consent by the deceased is 
evident, posthumous conception should be allowed.
The impact of the principle of autonomy is stronger than allowing 
posthumous conception: autonomy translates into a legal right of the 
surviving spouse or life partner to use the deceased spouse or life 
partner’s gametes (subject to their consent). The literature suggests 
that posthumous conception should be regulated as surrogacy 
applications.[10] However, implicit in the applicant’s argument based 
on autonomy, is that to require further conditions for allowing 
posthumous conception, e.g. requiring judicial oversight informed 
by psychological reports as for surrogacy applications, would restrict 
the surviving spouse or life partner’s autonomy and would be prima 
facie unconstitutional.
The applicant’s argument was simple: if posthumous conception is 
willed by the surviving spouse or life partner, consent by the deceased 
person is a necessary and sufficient requirement for posthumous 
conception. In this case, there was clearly consent: Aevitas’s sperm 
storage agreement that was filled out and signed by the applicant’s 
deceased husband provided documentary proof.
Aevitas’s affidavit
Aevitas filed a short affidavit in support of the applicant.[11] The gist 
of the affidavit was that Aevitas respects its patients’ autonomy, in 
particular the autonomy of the men who store their sperm with 
Aevitas to determine the fate of their sperm after their deaths. 
Interestingly, given this ethical position, Aevitas states that it had in 
fact in 2015 performed posthumous conception for another patient 
(and deceased patient). Although this fact shows Aevitas’s ethical 
consistency, it had to be handled carefully by the applicant, for at least 
two reasons. First, it may have been damaging to her case if she was 
perceived to rely on the fact of the previous posthumous conception 
as implicitly having any normative effect on the lawsuit. The fact 
that something has been done does not make it legal to do it. The 
applicant avoided any insinuation of posthumous conception being a 
fait accompli in our law. Second, it could have damaged the applicant’s 
case if she was perceived to rely on Aevitas’s ethical judgement 
to influence the court’s legal judgment. Although Aevitas’s 2015 
posthumous conception was recorded in the papers, the applicant did 
not rely on it in argument, and the court did not bring up the issue.
The judgment and its meaning
During oral argument in open court, the court observed that the 
applicant’s deceased husband clearly consented to his sperm being 
used posthumously and granted the relief sought, declaring that 
the applicant had the right to use her deceased husband’s sperm for 
procreation.[12] NC therefore created legal certainty regarding the 
basic aspects of posthumous conception. It is now established that 
the relevant legislation allows posthumous conception, and that the 
surviving spouse or life partner has a legal right to use the stored 
gametes for conception. This right may be subject to the consent 
by the deceased person, but this is not a valid inference from the 
judgment. What can be inferred from the judgment is that consent by 
the deceased person is sufficient as condition for allowing posthumous 
conception, and that the evidence before the court in NC was 
sufficient to prove such consent. However, uncertainty still remains 
whether consent is a necessary condition.
Regarding a fertility clinic’s statutory ownership of sperm, the right 
of the surviving spouse or life partner to use the deceased spouse or life 
partner’s stored gametes for posthumous conception renders a fertility 
clinic’s statutory ownership, where applicable, mere nominal ownership.
Conclusion: Implications for the 
practice of reproductive medicine
In cases that are analogous to the NC case, in other words where 
deceased persons provided written consent that their gametes can be 
used by their surviving spouse or life partner after their death, and 
where there is no controversy about such consent, fertility clinics may 
legally assist the surviving spouse or life partner with posthumous 
conception. In such cases, it will not be necessary to approach the 
court – the legal position has now been sufficiently established. 
However, in cases that differ from the facts of NC, e.g. where there was 
no written consent or no evidence of consent, it would be advisable to 
approach the court before proceeding with posthumous conception, 
as this requires further development of the law. A practical step for 
fertility clinics is to include the same options in their gamete storage 
agreements, in the event of death, as did Aevitas.
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